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SCALIA'S POKER: PUZZLES AND 
MYSTERIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Timothy P. O'Neill* 
Howard Hawks had some trouble directing The Big Sleep, 
the 1946 Humphrey Bogart/Lauren Bacall film nair based on 
Raymond Chandler's classic novel. He once convened a story 
conference with the film's three screenwriters, a group headed 
by Nobel Prize-winner William Faulkner. The four were having 
a terrible time trying to make sense of Chandler's labyrinthine 
tale. Flummoxed by one plot twist, Hawks fired off a telegram to 
Chandler reading "Who killed chauffeur?" The next day he re-
ceived Chandler's response: ''Damned if I know."' 
Such an answer would have been inconceivable from a 
writer such as Agatha Christie. Her books are elaborately plot-
ted, with every detail accounted for. There are no loose ends. 
Christie and Chandler were both fine writers. But they 
worked in very different genres: Christie created puzzles, while 
Chandler created mysteries. 
This point was brought home in a completely different con-
text by Gregory Treverton, a Senior Consultant at RAND, in his 
book Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information. 2 
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I. THE BIG SLEEP (Warner Brothers 1946). Like all good stories. this one has 
many variations. Compare the account found in GEORGE STEVENS. JR .. 
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE GREAT MOVIEMAKERS OF HOLLYWOOD'S GOLDEN AGE 
122 (2006) with the version in Roger Ebert. The Big Sleep. CHICAGO SUN-TIMES. June 
22. 1997. at 4. available at http://rogerebert.suntimes.com (enter The Big Sleep in the 
search field). 
2. GREGORY F. TREVERTON. RESHAPING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR AN 
AGE OF INFORMATION (2001). 
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He traces the shift in the roles of the United States intelligence 
community from the Cold War to the present. During the Cold 
War, Treverton notes, the most pressing questions facing the in-
telligence community were "puzzles," i.e., questions "that could, 
in principle, have been answered definitively if only the informa-
tion had been available."3 He offers examples of Cold War puz-
zles: How big was the Soviet economy? How many missiles did 
the Soviet Union have? How much steel did the Soviet Union 
produce during the previous year?4 These were all questions that 
could be definitively answered if one only had the right informa-
tion. 
Treverton differentiates these Cold War puzzles from what 
he calls ·'mysteries." A mystery is "a question that cannot be an-
swered with certainty even in principle."' And he contends that 
today "most of the critical questions facing American foreign 
policy are mysteries."" He offers these examples: Will China con-
tinue to grow rapidly or will it fragment? Will reform and de-
mocracy take hold in the former Soviet Union? Where is South 
Africa headed?7 These are mysteries because no one knows for 
certain what the answers will be. Unlike puzzles. which cannot 
be solved because of a lack of information, many mysteries these 
days ironically suffer from a surfeit of information. The problem 
is determining which parts of the mountain of available informa-
tion are truly relevant. 
This leads to another distinction: "Mysteries also differ from 
puzzles in that. by definition, puzzles have already happened." 
i.e .. the Soviet steel has already been made and the missiles have 
already been built.s Mysteries are more subtle. Not only are they 
unknowable at this time, but their eventual answer is intertwined 
with events which have not yet occurred. such as what U.S. gov-
ernment policy will be next year. 
Not everyone is equally adept at solving puzzles and myster-
ies. Malcolm Gladwell addressed this issue in a recent New 






R !d. at 12. Treverton is not the first scholar to distinguish puzzles and mysteries. 
The French existentialist Gabriel Marcel complained that 20th century philosophers had 
··lost sight of the mysteries by distracting themselves with puzzles:· ROBERT C. 
SOLOMON. THE JOY OF PHILOSOPHY 13 (1999). I am indebted to Professor Jeffrey Lip-
shaw for this reference. 
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mystery rather than a puzzle." Gladwell notes that "Mysteries ... 
are a lot murkier [than puzzles] .... [S]ometimes the question 
itself cannot be answered. Puzzles come to satisfying conclu-
sions. Mysteries often don't." 10 He quotes Yale law professor 
Jonathan Macey that puzzles are "transmitter-dependent;" that 
is, their solutions turn on what information we are provided. 
Mysteries, on the other hand, are "receiver-dependent;" their so-
lutions turn on the skills of the listener. 11 
What does all of this have to do with law? I would suggest 
that the distinction between puzzles and mysteries may describe 
a significant dichotomy in constitutional interpretation. Some 
justices view interpreting the Constitution as a puzzle- they seek 
a definite answer from the past by looking at information that 
will yield an objective answer. They see constitutional interpre-
tation as "transmitter-dependent." Others see it as a mystery-
they are less certain that history will provide a clear answer, and 
assume that they must use their own skills to process information 
from many sources to reach an answer. They see constitutional 
interpretation as "receiver-dependent." They believe that their 
answers will often be provisional rather than final. 
This Essay contends that whether a justice views constitu-
tional interpretation as a puzzle or a mystery has important 
ramifications not only with respect to the justice's own views in 
an individual case, but also in the way he interacts with other jus-
tices on a collegial court. 
The Essay is divided into three parts. Part I offers an exam-
ple of a particular constitutional provision- the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While some justices view 
this clause as a puzzle, others see it as a mystery. It examines 
opinions by Justices John M. Harlan and Felix Frankfurter that 
champion the view that the content of the clause is not suscepti-
ble to definitive, mechanical answers. According to Harlan and 
Frankfurter. its meaning requires a large amount of information 
and experienced judgment. In the terminology of this Essay, 
they viewed the Due Process Clause as an ongoing mystery. The 
Essay then contrasts this perspective with Justice Hugo Black's 
famous dissent in Adamson v California 12 offering the definitive 
account of the ''total incorporation" theory. Justices who fol-
9. Malcolm Gladwell. Open Secrets: En ron and the Perils of Full Disclosure. THE 
NEW YORKER. Jan.~- 2007. at 44. . 
10. /d. at 46. 
II. /d. at 52. 
12. Adamson v. California. 332 U.S. 46. 6~ (1947). 
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lowed this theory saw the Due Process Clause as having a fixed 
meaning as defined by the Bill of Rights. They saw the meaning 
of the Due Process Clause as the solution to a puzzle. 
Part II turns from examining a specific constitutional provi-
sion as either a puzzle or a mystery to considering two current 
Supreme Court justices who disagree over whether constitu-
tional interpretation as a whole should be considered mystery-
solving or puzzle-solving. It looks at two books written by Jus-
tices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia. Justice Breyer has set 
out his philosophy of interpretation in his book Active Liberty13• 
In it, he presents a theory similar to what this Essay describes as 
a "mystery" approach to constitutional interpretation. On the 
other hand, Justice Antonin Scalia in his book A Matter of lnter-
pretation14 views constitutional interpretation more as an exer-
cise in historical puzzle-solving. 
Part III temporarily leaves both the United States and the 
Supreme Court to describe a famous confrontation between two 
philosophers that occurred over sixty years ago at Cambridge 
University. The two men were Karl Popper and Ludwig Witt-
genstein. Wittgenstein saw philosophy as a discipline that should 
confine itself to finding solutions to what he explicitly referred to 
as linguistic "puzzles."15 Popper, on the other hand, advocated a 
much broader role for philosophy. He wanted philosophy to dis-
cuss what he termed "problems" -in many ways similar to what 
this Essay describes as "mysteries." The Essay then uses the 
Popper-Wittgenstein confrontation as a template for comparing 
and contrasting the puzzle-solving Scalia and the mystery-solving 
Breyer. It then examines the work of psychologist Philip Tetlock 
who has discovered personality differences between these two 
general types of thinkers. It finally suggests how the "puz-
zle/mystery" dichotomy might affect relations between justices 
on a collegial court. 
13. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LiBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005). 
14. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws. in SCALIA, A 
MA TIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Gutmann ed .. 
1997). 
15. It is important to note. however. that Wittgenstein's concept of a "puzzle" bears 
little resemblance to either Treverton's or Gladwell"s definition of that term. See infra 
note RO. 
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE AS PUZZLE, 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSE AS MYSTERY: 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
667 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
mandates that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law. "1 After its ratification 
in 1868, the meaning of the clause became the focus of intense 
judicial scrutiny. 
The theory the U.S. Supreme Court used to interpret this 
clause for almost a century after ratification has been referred to 
as the "fundamental fairness" theory. One of the classic exposi-
tions of this theory of due process was written in 1961 by Justice 
John M. Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman. 17 Responding to 
Justice Hugo Black's argument that Fourteenth Amendment 
due process was exactly equivalent to all the specific guarantees 
of the Bill of Rights, Harlan argued for a more flexible interpre-
tation: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content 
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that 
can be said is that ... .it has represented the balance which 
our Nation .... has struck between ... .liberty and the de-
mands of organized society .... The balance of which I speak 
is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what 
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as 
well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a 
living thing. 1H 
And just how does a justice impute meaning to the Due 
Process Clause? Harlan states that the meaning of any constitu-
tional provision "must be discerned from [its] larger context." 19 
And inasmuch as this context is not one of words, but of his-
tory and purposes, the full scope of the liberty guaranteed by 
[the Clause] cannot be found in or limited by the precise 
terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the 
Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points 
pricked out. ... [Rather,] [i]t is a rational continuum which, 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.§ I. 
17. Poe v. Ullman. 367 U.S. 497. 522 ( 1961) (Harlan. J.. dissenting from dismissal of 
appeals). 
18. /d. at 542 (emphasis added). 
19. /d. at 542-543. 
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broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial ar-
bitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.'" 
Harlan concludes his discussion by noting that 
Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be consid-
ered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they 
have been rationally perceived and historically developed. 
Though we exercise limited ... judgment, yet there is no "me-
chanical yardstick," no "mechanical answer." The decision of 
an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which fol-
low closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The new 
decision must take "its place in relation to what went before 
and further [cut] a channel for what is to come."'1 
Compare Justice Harlan's claim that the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause is not amenable to a "mechanical answer" to 
Justice Black's famous defense of "total incorporation" in his 
dissent in Adamson v California. 22 After extensively relating the 
details surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Black concludes that the "purpose of those who framed, 
advocated, and adopted the Amendment had been to make the 
Bill of Rights applicable to the States."" He rails against the au-
dacity of those justices who believe they are ''now wise enough 
to improve on the Bill of Rights by substituting natural law con-
cepts for the Bill of Rights."'4 Those justices who do not accept 
the Bill of Rights as embodying the entire meaning of due proc-
ess arrogate to themselves "boundless power under ·natural law' 
periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to 
conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time 
constitutes 'civilized decency' and 'fundamental liberty and jus-
tice.,,,; Not tethering the meaning of due process to the Bill of 
Rights allows the Court "to roam at large in the broad expanses 
of policy and morals and to trespass, all too freely, on the legi~la­
tive domain of the States as well as the Federal Government.''-6 
Naturally, Justice Frankfurter disagreed.27 Responding di-
rectly to Black's "total incorporation" theory, Frankfurter in-
sisted that 
20. !d. (emphasis added). 
21. !d. at 544 (citation omitted). 
22. Adamson. 332 U.S. at 68 (Black. J .. dissenting). 
23. !d. at 74. 
24. !d. at 90. 
25. !d. at 69. 
26. !d. at 90. 
27. !d. at 59 (Frankfurter. J .. concurring). 
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A construction which gives to due process no independent 
function but turns it into a summary of the specific provisions 
of the Bill of Rights would ... tear up by the roots much of 
the fabric of law in the several States, and would deprive the 
States of opportunity for reforms in legal process .... It 
would assume that no other abuses would reveal themselves 
in the course of time than those which had become manifest 
in 1791. ... 1 udicial review of [due process] inescapably im-
poses upon this court an exercise of judgment .. .in order to 
ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of 
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of 
English-speaking peoples ... . 28 
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In chiding Justice Black for his total incorporation theory, 
Frankfurter memorably stated that the standards of due process 
cannot be reduced to a finite list, "as though they were prescrip-
tions in a pharmacopoeia." 29 And he went on to criticize Black's 
charge that a "fundamental fairness" approach to due process al-
lowed judges to simply apply their own concepts of natural law: 
[A judgment construing due process] must move within the 
limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based 
upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. The 
fact that judges among themselves may differ whether in a 
particular case a trial offends accepted notions of justice is not 
disproof that general rather than idiosyncratic standards are 
I. d '() app 1e . · 
These opinions elegantly set out the very different perspec-
tives of viewing a constitutional provision as a mystery as op-
posed to a puzzle. To Justice Black, the meaning of due process 
is a puzzle to be worked out from historical sources. He con-
cludes that the purpose behind the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to make the Bill of Rights applica-
ble against the States. The answer is "transmitter-dependent;" 
the job of the justice is simply to channel the intent and purpose 
of the ratifiers. 
To Harlan and Frankfurter, however, it is not that simple. 
The meaning of due process cannot be pigeon-holed into merely 
being defined by the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. It 
is a "living thing" that represents a "balance" that must be con-
tinually re-examined and re-defined. It is a "rational continuum'' 
2S. !d. at f17. 
29. /d. at 6S. 
30. /d. 
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rather than a series of discrete pinpricks. In Frankfurter's blunt 
words, the meaning of due process ''inescapably imposes upon 
this court an exercise of judgment." By definition, the meaning 
of due process is "receiver-dependent." Due process is not Su-
doku with one specific solution; it is a living thing. an ongoing 
mystery inviting different solutions at different times. 
Thus, from the example of the Due Process Clause, it is 
clear we can interpret one specific clause of the Constitution as 
either a puzzle or a mystery. But it is also true that some justices 
regard constitutional interpretation in general as either a puzzle 
or a mystery. We now turn to the examples of two such justices. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AS 
PUZZLE, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
AS MYSTERY: THE JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHIES OF 
ANTONIN SCALIA AND STEPHEN BREYER 
What effect does the puzzle/mystery dichotomy have on the 
overall judicial philosophy of a justice? We can compare two jus-
tices, Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia, who have both written 
thoughtful books explaining their views on constitutional inter-
pretation. 
Justice Breyer's book Active Liberty sets out his theory of 
both statutory and constitutional interpretation. Ken I. Kersch 
has reduced Breyer's theory on interpretation to two concepts: 
First, a judge should interpret a law in light of both its pur-
poses (or objectives) and the consequences of that judge's in-
terpretation for the achievement of those purposes. Second, 
an approach that accords due regard to the purposes and con-
sequences of interpreting particular statutory and constitu-
tional provisions will advance the overarching purpose of the 
Constitution as a whole, which is to promote "the people's 
will,'' or "democracy,'' or "active liberty."3t 
Breyer traces the origin of the concept of "active liberty" 
back to the nineteenth-century French political philosopher Ben-
jamin Constant.32 Constant referred to the "liberty of the an-
cients" as consisting of "a sharing of a nation's sovereign authority 
among that nation's citizens."33 According to Constant, this is ac-
31. Ken I. Kersch. Justice Breyer's Mandarin Liberty, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 763 
(2006). 
32. BREYER. supra note 13. at 3-4. 
33. !d. at 4. 
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complished through recognizing the people's right to "an active 
and constant participation in collective power.•·'-~ Breyer considers 
this concept to be so crucial to the essence of American govern-
ment that he flatly states that "[m]y thesis is that courts should 
take greater account of the Constitution's democratic nature 
when they interpret constitutional and statutory texts. ''3' 
Breyer explicitly eschews grand theory in interpreting broad 
constitutional texts. He warns that judges should "not expect 
highly general instructions themselves to determine the outcome 
of difficult concrete cases where language is open-ended and 
precisely defined purpose is difficult to ascertain. "36 To begin a 
quest for meaning, a judge must first see "texts as driven by pur-
poses. "37 This is particularly important because the Constitution 
must constantly be applied to new subjects not envisioned by the 
Framers. Breyer then quotes Learned Hand's tenet that a judge 
should "reconstruct the past solution imaginatively in its setting 
and project the purposes which inspired it upon the concrete oc-
casions which arise for their decision. "38 
But understanding purposes is not enough. The judge must 
also be cognizant of the consequences that might result from a 
specific decision. This means that the judge must have the abil-
ity, in the words of Louis Brandeis, to consider the "contempo-
rary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community 
to be affected. "39 And, as Frankfurter wrote, since "the purpose 
of construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is 
logically relevant should be excluded."40 
Breyer again cites a Frankfurter speech for a proposition 
that could have been part of his concurrence in Adamson v Cali-
fornia. Frankfurter wrote that certain constitutional language re-
flects "fundamental aspirations and ... 'moods,' embodied in 
provisions like the due process and equal protection clauses, 
34. !d. at 5 (quoting BENJAMIN CONSTANT. The Liberty of the Ancients Compared 
with That of the Moderns, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 309,316 (Biancamaria Fontana trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)). 
35. /d. 
36. !d. at 18. 
37. /d. at 17 (emphasis in original). 
38. !d. at 18 (quoting LEARNED HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judici-
ary to Civilization. in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED 
HAND 172,174 (Irving Dillard ed .. 1952)). 
39. !d. at 18 (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS. in THE WORDS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS 
115 (Solomon Goldman ed .. 1953)). 
40. /d. (quoting Felix Frankfurter. Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 541 (1947)). 
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which were desiRned not to be precise and positive directions for 
rules of action." 1 
In interpreting these open-ended clauses, a judge may find 
herself between a legal Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, 
the judge is not free merely to impose her own views of what she 
thinks is best. On the other hand, a judge must avoid being 
"wooden, in uncritically resting on formulas" to interpret consti-
tutional text.4c 
What route should a judge take? Breyer supports a "tradi-
tion'' that "answers with an attitude, an attitude that hesitates to 
rely upon any single theory or grand view of law. of interpreta-
tion, or of the Constitution. "43 
Breyer's philosophy is a blueprint for approaching the Con-
stitution as a mystery, rather than a puzzle. To solve a puzzle you 
look only at what has already occurred. But to Breyer. it is not 
possible to interpret the Constitution in this way. Its language is 
"open-ended" and its purposes are often difficult to ascertain. 
His solution is to see constitutional interpretation as receiver-
dependent. The judge must look to all sources for help in solving 
the mystery. Nothing that is "logically relevant" should be ex-
cluded. This information is necessary for the judge to be able to 
"reconstruct" the past "imaginatively" in order to project the 
purposes which inspired the text upon the actual case now facing 
the judge. 
Compare this with Justice Scalia's theory of constitutional 
i~tergretation as expressed in his book A Matter of Interpreta-
tion. 
Scalia begins by distinguishing the English common-law sys-
tem from the American legal system. The American system is 
governed by written constitutions and statutes. The English 
common law system, however, was court-driven. The common 
law judges performed two functions. The first was to apply the 
law to the facts of the cases they were deciding. But, according to 
Scalia, the second function was the more important one: to make 
the law.45 
41. /d. (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER. The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices. 
in OF LAW AND LiFE & OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FELIX FRANKFURTER. 1956-1963. at 77.94 (Philip B. Kurland ed .. 1967)). 
42 /d. at 19. 
43. /d. at 19 (emphasis in original). 
44. SCALIA. supra note 14. 
45. /d. at 6. 
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And how did the common law judge make law? Scalia uses 
a striking image. Because of the principle of stare decisis, "com-
mon law grew in a peculiar fashion-rather like a Scrabble 
board. No rule of decision previously announced could be 
erased, but qualifications could be added to it."4" Thus, law stu-
dents are presented with a particular image of the great judge-a 
judge who is able to apply and distinguish precedent on the way 
to establishing the best possible rule of law. 
So what's wrong with this picture? Nothing, Scalia says, and 
"All of this would be an unqualified good were it not for a trend 
in government that has developed in recent centuries, called de-
mocracy."47 Now the job of a judge is not to make law, but rather 
to apply the law that has been created by the people of the na-
tion through the democratic process. 
Scalia bemoans the fact that "the American bar and Ameri-
can legal education, by and large, are unconcerned with the fact 
that we have no intelligible theory" of statutory interpretation.48 
One canon holds that the judge's job is to give effect to "the in-
tent of the legislature." What this means in reality, Scalia con-
tends, is that the judge seeks not the legislature's subjective in-
tent, but rather seeks "a sort of 'objectified' intent."49 And to 
make this determination, you as a judge will come "to the con-
clusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean-
which is exactly how judges decide things under the common 
law."50 At this point, you have come full circle. 
What is the solution? A judge should avoid asking what the 
legislature "intended" by the words of a statute. Instead, the 
judge should ask only what the words mean. Scalia refers to this 
theory as "textualism. "51 
Interestingly, he applies his textualist theory to language in 
both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, 
which state that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law." He disapprovingly notes 
that the Clause has been interpreted to prevent the government 
from "taking away certain liberties beyond those ... that are 
specifically named in the Constitution. "52 Scalia disagrees with 
46. /d. at 8 (emphasis in original). 
47. /d. at 9. 
48. /d. at 14. 
49. /d. at 17. 
50. /d. at 18 (emphasis in original). 
51. /d. at 23. 
52. /d. at 24 (emphasis in original). 
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this interpretation because .. [b]y its inescapable terms, [the Due 
Process Clause] guarantees only process. Property can be taken 
by the state; liberty can be taken; even life can be taken: but not 
without the process that our traditions require-notably, a val-
idly enacted law and a fair trial."" 
Turning to constitutional interpretation in general, he con-
tends that the '"Great Divide ... .is not that between Framers' in-
tent and objective meaning, but rather that between original 
meaning (whether derived from Framers' intent or not) and cur-
rent meaning."54 He ridicules the concept of a "Living Constitu-
tion, a body of law that (unlike normal statutes) grows from age 
to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing society."55 He 
characterizes the so-called "Living Constitution" as nothing 
more than "the common law returned, but infinitely more pow-
erful than what the old common law ever pretended to be."56 
And, Scalia adds, the common law way of making law is not the 
way to construe a democratically-adopted text.57 
What is the proper way to interpret such a text? By seeking 
the original meaning of the words. Scalia concedes that there is 
no guarantee that this will yield an answer on which everyone 
will agree; there can be disagreement on what is the "original 
meaning" of a specific text as well as disagreement on how that 
meaning should apply to the situation facing the court. But, 
Scalia insists, "the originalist at least knows what he is looking 
for: the original meaning of the text. Often- indeed, I dare say 
usually-that is easy to discern and simple to apply."5~ 
Thus, for Scalia "original meaning" provides a method for 
determining the proper interpretation of both constitutional and 
statutory text. In his Supreme Court opinions, it is not uncom-
mon for Scalia to establish the meaning of a word through use of 
a dictionary.59 Meaning is a "puzzle" to be worked out. For 
Breyer, on the other hand, the meaning of constitutional text is a 
more open-ended quest, requiring consideration of a broad 
range of legal materials- in other words, more like approaching 
a "mystery." 
53. /d. at 24-25. 
54. /d. at 38 (emphasis in original). 
55. /d. 
56. /d. 
57. !d. at 40. 
58. /d. at 45. 
59. But see Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Su-
preme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275. 317 (1998) (criticizing Scalia's assumption that dic-
tionaries precisely capture the ordinary meaning of words). 
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It is interesting to compare the puzzle/mystery dichotomy to 
Jack Balkin's recent work in constitutional interpretation."" 
Balkin distinguishes between what he calls a focus on the "origi-
nal meaning" of a constitutional text as opposed to the "original 
expected application" of the text."1 As an example, he cites Jus-
tice's Scalia's reading of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Scalia has written that the 
principle underlying this clause "is not a moral principle of 'cru-
elty' that philosophers can play with in the future, but rather the 
existing society's assessment of what [was] cruel [in 1791 ] .... It 
is. in other words, rooted in the moral perceptions of the time. ""2 
Scalia would thus answer the question of whether the death pen-
alty violates the Eighth Amendment by asking how people living 
in 1791 would have answered the question."' Balkin calls Scalia's 
version of originalism a search for the "original expected appli-
cation.'' In the terminology of this Essay, Scalia sees the meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment as being a transmitter-dependent 
puzzle. 
Balkin contrasts this with the quest for the "original mean-
ing'' of a constitutional clause. Balkin contends that we must 
look not only to text, but to the principles underlying the text.04 
What is "cruel and unusual" must be judged by "contemporary 
application" of this constitutional command."' Each generation 
"must take responsibility for interpreting and implementing the 
Constitution in its own era. "66 Consider how similar this is to 
Breyer's view that a judge must see "texts as driven by pur-
poses."67 The judge must "reconstruct" the past "imaginatively" 
in order to apply the constitutional aspirations to the case at bar. 
60. Jack M. Balkin. Abonion and Original Meaning. 24 CONST. COMME:-.<T. 291 
(2007). 
61. /d. at 294-96. 
62. Antonin Scalia. Response. in A MA ITER OF NTERPRETATIOK. supra note 14. at 
145 (emphasis in original). 
63. /d. 
64. Balkin. supra note 60. at 304. 
65. /d. at 295. 
66. /d. at 306. Note the similarity to Ronald Dworkin's distinction between consti-
tutional "concepts" and "conceptions." Dworkin contends that. in considering for exam-
ple whether segregated schools are currently unconstitutional, it is irrelevant that the au-
thors of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may have supported 
them. "Equal protection" is a concept that admits of many conceptions. The Clause con-
stitutionalizes a concept that can support many different conceptions over the course of 
decades of societal changes. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOL:SLY. 132-37 
(Duckworth. 1977). 
67. BREYER. supra note 13. at 17 (emphasis in original). 
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In the terminology of this Essay, Breyer sees constitutional in-
terpretation as a receiver-dependent mystery. 
Jan Crawford Greenburg expresses this in yet another way. 
She refers to Isaiah Berlin's famous division of thinkers into 
"hedgehogs" and "foxes.""" Hedgehogs are those who know "one 
big thing,'" while foxes "know many things."69 As she applies this 
dichotomy to the Supreme Court, "[H]edgehogs . . . don't place 
much value on compromise and consensus. They think there are 
right answers in the law .... Scalia is a classic hedgehog who is 
guided by an overarching theory and assesses cases in light of it 
... Breyer, in contrast, is a fox, a one-case-at-a-time pragmatist 
without a grand global theory." 70 
Scalia the puzzle-solving hedgehog and Breyer the mystery-
loving fox -could different modes of judicial thinking actually 
affect the way justices interact with their colleagues? 
III. SCALIA'S POKER: WHAT A DISPUTE 
BETWEEN TWO PHILOSOPHERS MAY TEACH 
US ABOUT RELATIONS BETWEEN 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 
What effect does the puzzle/mystery dichotomy have on the 
way Supreme Court justices do their day-to-day work on and off 
the bench? Before answering this question, we must first go back 
to a meeting held in England over sixty years ago. 
At 8:30p.m. on Friday, October 25, 1946, the Moral Science 
Club of Cambridge University held its weekly meeting in Room 
H3 of King's College. No one attending that night's meeting 
could have anticipated that what occurred would become the 
subject of debate for decades to come. The best account of that 
night was recently provided by David Edmonds and John Eidi-
now in their book Wittgenstein's Poker. 71 
The guiding spirit of the Moral Science Club was the philoso-
pher Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was Wittgenstein himself who dic-
tated the format for the invitation to all guest speakers. The invi-
68. ISAIAH BERLI:\. The Hedgehog and the Fox. in RUSSIAN THINKERS 22 (Viking 
1978). 
69. /d. at 22. 
70. JAt-O CRAWFORD GREENBt.:RG. SUPREME CONFLJCf: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE STRL'GGLE FOR COt-OTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 181 (2007) 
(emphasis added). 
71. DAVID ED\10:\DS & JOHN EIDit-OOW. WITTGE"'STEIN'S POKER: THE STORY OF 
A TE:\-MI-;UTE ARGL'\IE'H BETWEEN TWO GREAT PHILOSOPHERS (2001 ). 
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tation specified that the speaker should be prepared to present 
"short papers, or a few opening remarks, stating some philosophi-
cal puzzle.''n In response, that evening's guest speaker Karl ~op­
per had titled his paper "Are There Philosophical Problems?" ' 
The title was not as innocuous as it sounds. Popper's refusal 
to accede to Wittgenstein's request that he discuss a "philoso-
phical puzzle" illustrated the chasm that existed between these 
two giants of twentieth-century philosophy. And straddling the 
chasm was the philosopher both saw as a mentor and who was 
also present in Room H3 that night- Bertrand Russell. 
Starting with Descartes in the seventeenth century, and con-
tinuing through the work of the great British empiricists such as 
Locke and Hume, the basic thrust of Western philosophy cen-
tered around epistemology- the study of what we can know. 7~ 
Russell's work, however, displaced epistemology both with the 
philosophy of language and with the "premise that our words are 
the lenses through which we access our thoughts and the world. 
We cannot see the world without them."7' 
Wittgenstein and Popper each took Russell's insights in dif-
ferent directions. Popper saw Russell's linguistic insights as "no 
more than an extremely useful device in the examination of what 
mattered-real problems."7" Yet Wittgenstein had come to see 
linguistic scrutiny not as a means to an end, but rather as the ul-
timate end of philosophy. 
Popper's best known book, The Open Society and Its Ene-
mies, had been published in England shortly before he faced 
Wittgenstein and Russell at Cambridge on that night in 1946. 
The book was a philosophical response to the growth of fascism 
throughout the world. Popper contended that there was no guar-
antee that progress was inevitable. Rather, progress depended 
on the proper conditions. Popper further argued that the most 
effective environment for both social and economic advance was 
"openness." This meant that progress could only come through 
trial and error. This also meant that we should welcome the fact 
that "J e ]rror was always possible [and] 'truth' was never cer-
tain."7 Falsification should be embraced, for only when a theory 
72. !d. at 28. 
73. !d. at 1. 
74. !d. at 174. 
75. !d. at 175. 
76. !d. at 179. 
77. !d. at 190. 
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is shown to be false does there arise the impetus to progress to a 
new level of progress. 
As Edmonds and Eidinow express it: 
Popper's insight was to recognize that democracy should not 
be viewed merely as a luxury, something a country can afford 
only once it has reached a certain stage of development. 
Rather, democracy itself is a prerequisite to progress. He be-
lieved democracy entails a rational attitude that can be 
summed up in the lines, "I may be wrong and you may be 
right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth." 78 
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, believed that understand-
ing the use- and misuse- of language should be the central 
quest of philosophy. For example, admitting that an object can-
not "be red and green all over" was to Wittgenstein not some 
deep metaphysical truth, but merely a rule of grammar. 79 Witt-
genstein described philosophical questions in terms of "puzzles" 
of language, rather than "problems" in the broader sense. 81) 
Where was Bertrand Russell in the Popper-Wittgenstein 
conflict? Russell was firmly in the Popper camp on the need for 
philosophers to address large contemporary political problems. 
According to Edmonds and Eidinow, Russell believed that Witt-
genstein's emphasis on linguistic puzzles was ''dragging Cam-
bridge philosophy down a cul-de-sac of tedium and triviality. "81 
He agreed with Popper that philosophy needed to deal with the 
large international issues of the Cold War and the rise of nuclear 
weapons. If Wittgenstein were right, Russell wrote, then phi-
losophy was "at best, a slight help to lexicographers, and at 
worst, an ideal tea-table amusement. ,sc 
Within this context, it is clear that when Popper answered 
Wittgenstein's request for a discussion of a "puzzle" with his 
7K !d. 
79. /d. at 183. 
80. !d. at 182-82. It is important to understand that a ""puzzle"" to Wittgenstein bears 
little relation to Gregory Treverton·s definition of a ""puzzle"" that is otherwise used in 
this Essay. A ··puzzle"" to Treverton is a question "'that could. in principle. have been an-
swered if only the information had been available ... TREVERTON. supra note 2. at 11. 
Also. a ""puzzle" to Treverton concerns something that has already happened. !d. at 12. 
For Wittgenstein. however. a ""puzzle" promised no simple solution; it was. rather. a 
springboard for philosophical discussion. Consider. for example. Wittgenstein"s famous 
""puzzle" concerning music: How is it possible to be surprised by musical events that one 
knows will happen? Clearly this kind of paradox is different from Treverton·s concept of 
"puzzle ... 
81. EDMONDS & EIDINOW. supra note 71. at 187. 
82. /d. at 188. 
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own paper on philosophical ''problems," Popper was throwing 
down a gauntlet. 
So what happened in Room H3? Edmonds and Eidinow 
concede that studying the accounts of those present is akin to 
reading a British version of Rashomon. What does seem clear is 
that a loud argument erupted between Popper and Wittgen-
stein.~' At some point Wittgenstein picked up a fireplace poker 
and began jabbing it to punctuate his statements."-~ Was he 
threatening Popper? Was it hot? Memories differ. What does 
seem clear is that at some point Wittgenstein dropped the poker! 
exchanged some angry words with Russell. and left the room."' 
Popper stayed and finished the lecture."" 
Much of what happened in the room will remain a mystery. 
But one point is clear: the philosopher who focused on "puzzles" 
exploded and left the room while the philosopher who focused 
on broader "problems" remained. 
I do not want to stretch a rough comparison to the point of 
caricature. But, on the one hand, we have Popper confronting 
the global "problem" of how a society can prevent the spread of 
fascism; on the other hand, there is Wittgenstein's hedgehog-like 
insistence on discussing philosophy in terms of linguistic "puz-
zles," such as why in comic strips a balloon with words denotes 
"speaking" while a cloud with words represents "thinking. ""7 
Across the ocean, we have Breyer's style of constitutional inter-
pretation as "mystery" with its talk of "moods'' and "attitudes" 
and its insistence that constitutional language was "designed not 
to be grecise [nor to provide] positive directions for rules of ac-
tion;" on the other hand, we have Scalia insisting that "usually 
[the original meanin~ of constitutional text] is easy to discern 
and simple to apply." 9 
Some see puzzles where others see mysteries. Could the 
personalities of fox-like thinkers inclined to see the world as 
open-ended "problems" and "mysteries'' perhaps differ from the 
83. !d. at 212-13. 
84. !d. at 213-14. 
85. !d. at 214-15. 
86. /d. at 215. 
87. !d. Again. Wittgenstein's definition of .. puzzle"' is much different from the defi-
nition otherwise used in this Essay. See supra text accompanying note 80. But what is sig-
nificant in terms of this Essay is Wittgenstein's dogged insistence-again. his hedgehog-
like behavior-that the philosophers speaking at the Moral Science Club must conform 
to his current vision of philosophy as being comprised of "'puzzles ... 
88. BREYER. supra note 13. at 18. 
89. SCALIA. supra note 14. at 45. 
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hedgehogs, who are absolutely certain that theirs is the only true 
path? 
Philip Tetlock, a psychologist at the University of Califor-
nia-Berkeley, recent!~ wrote a book analyzing people who make 
political predictions. The book is based on a study he con-
ducted of 82,361 forecasts made over a twenty year period by 
284 people considered experts on political and economic trends. 
His short conclusion was that people who make predictions for a 
living-media "talking heads," academics, high-level govern-
ment advisors-were not significantly more reliable in their pre-
dictions than non-experts. 
In his study, Tetlock discovered something striking. He 
found that one factor that distinguished good predictors from 
bad predictors had nothing to do with what they knew, but rather 
with how they thought: Berlin's "foxes" scored higher than Ber-
lin's ''hedgehogs." As Tetlock expresses it: 
Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers who 'know one big 
thing,' aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one 
big thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with 
those who ''do not get it," and express considerable confidence 
that they are already pretty proficient forecasters. at least in 
the long term. High scorers look like foxes: thinkers who 
know many small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of 
grand schemes, see explanation and prediction not as deduc-
tive exercises but rather as exercises in flexible ''ad hocery" 
that require stitching together diverse sources of information, 
and are rather diffident about their own forecasting prow-
91 
ess .... 
Look at Tetlock's descriptions: the hedgehog's "bristly im-
patience with those who 'do not get it,"' as opposed to the fox's 
skepticism towards grand schemes and ''diffidence" concerning 
her prowess as a predictor. Could this suggest a lens for examin-
ing how foxes and hedgehogs interact with each other in a group 
setting? 
Consider this account of Wittgenstein at a seminar. A par-
ticipant at another meeting of the Moral Science Club related 
Wittgenstein's reaction to a paper with which he disagreed: 
"This sort of thing has got to be stopped. Bad philosophers are 
90. PHILIP TETLOCK. EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? How 
CAN WE KNOW? (2005). 
91. /d. at 73.75 (emphasis added). 
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like slum landlords. It's my job to put them out of business. "~2 
Compare this with what was previously noted to be a maxim fre-
quently cited by Popper: '"I may be wrong and you may be right, 
and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.""' 
Now compare what Justices Scalia and Breyer have said 
about their respective theories of constitutional interpretation. 
Breyer has described his approach as "an attitude, an attitude 
that hesitates to rely upon any single theory or grand view of 
law, of interpretation, or of the Constitution."94 On the other 
hand, Scalia has explained his theory of "original meaning" 
thusly: '"But the originalist at least knows what he is looking for: 
the original meaning of the text. Often- indeed, I dare say usu-
ally- that is easy to discern and simple to apply. "95 To Scalia, law 
is a puzzle that should yield a definite answer; to Breyer, law is a 
mystery that is less certain and more open-ended. 
One can never be absolutely sure he has solved a true mys-
tery; input from others should always be welcome. On the other 
hand, once you have solved a puzzle, there is nothing more bor-
ing than watching someone else struggle to solve it. And if you 
truly believe that you have found the one and only solution to 
the puzzle, you might be inclined to exhibit "bristly impatience" 
towards those too dull to understand. 
Could this affect a justice's courtroom behavior? Here is 
how Jeffrey Rosen describes Justice Scalia's performance on the 
bench: 
Scalia's tendency to dominate oral argument with aggressive 
questions and showy put-downs alienated several justices, in-
cluding Rehnquist. who once shook his finger at Scalia for in-
terrupting Kennedy .... Scalia's jokes were often at the ex-
pense of lawyers and his colleagues . . . . He also has the 
reputation as something of a sore loser who reads his dissent-
ing opinions from the bench in aggrieved tones.% 
Compare this to Rosen's description of Breyer's courtroom 
demeanor: '"Breyer ... has a gentler temperament and more in-
tellectual humility: at oral arguments, he often summed up the 
strongest arguments on both sides of a case, candidly identified 
92. EDMONDS & EIDINOW supra note 71. at 200. 
93. /d. at 190. 
9-1. BREYER. supra note 13. at 19 (emphasis in original). 
95. SCALIA. supra note 1-1. at -15. 
96. JEFFREY ROSEN. THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES 
THAT DEFINED AMERICA 199-200 (2007). 
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the issues on which he was still undecided, and invited the law-
yers to try to persuade him through an energetic conversation. "97 
In a similar vein, compare Wittgenstein's and Scalia's rela-
tions with colleagues. Both Noel Annan and Friedrich von 
Hayek wrote about their experiences at other Moral Science 
Club meetings where Wittgenstein also waved a poker in anger 
in reaction to comments with which he disagreed; Har,ek even 
added that he thought Wittgenstein "had gone mad." 8 At an-
other meeting, Wittgenstein made this remark in the presence of 
Alfred Ewing, a Cambridge colleague for whom Wittgenstein 
had intellectual contempt: "Let us make the purely hypothetical 
assumption that Ewing has a mind." 99 
Compare this to Scalia's relations with his colleagues. Rosen 
notes that "Scalia, by his own account, is unconcerned about his 
relative failure to win many converts on the Court."'00 Rosen 
writes that Scalia's dissents have had the tendency to treat ever~ 
colleague who disagreed with him "as a politician or a fool."' ' 
Jan Crawford Greenburg flatly states that "[Scalia] is regarded 
as the Court's preeminent master at the art of burning 
bridges." 10" She recounts how Scalia publicly mocked Justice 
O'Connor's concurring opinion in an abortion case, declaring 
that it ''cannot be taken seriously." 103 It was a slight O'Connor 
would never forget. 11l4 Greenburg also describes similar run-ins 
with Justices Souter105 and Kennedy.'06 Because of such tactics, 
Rosen declares that Scalia has "managed to alienate even his 
ideological sympathizers." 107 In fact, Christopher E. Smith108 has 
97. /d. 
98. EDMONDS & EIDINOW. supra note 71. at 161. 
99. /d. at 53. 
100. ROSEN. supra note 96. at 200. 
101. /d. at 182. 
102. GREENBURG. supra note 70. at 160. 
103. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia. 1.. 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
104. GREENBURG supra note 70. at 83. 
105. /d. at 130. 
106. !d. at 157. 
107. RoSEN supra note 96. at 199. Even the Court's newest members are not im-
mune. Consider Justice Scalia's recent opinion in Federal Election Commission v. Wzs-
consin Right to Life. Inc .. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007) (Scalia, 1.. concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). Scalia first criticized Chief Justice Roberts' opinion in the case for 
distinguishing. rather than overruling, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 
U.S. 93 (2003). FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2684 n.7 (Scalia, J .. concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). Claiming that Roberts' reasoning had effec-
tively overturned McConnell "without saving so," Scalia charged that '"This faux judicial 
rest~aint is judicial obfuscation." !d. Scaiia then went on to criticize Justice Alito's con-
curring opinion in the same case. accusing Alito of having contradicted himself in another 
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argued that Scalia's continual personal attacks on O'Connor and 
Kennedy may have contributed to their decision not to join 
Scalia in trying to overturn Roe v. Wade. 1m 
Perhaps most telling is Rosen's observation that "[Scalia] 
had a powerful need to bind himself in advance to rigid rules, 
but was so convinced of his own virtue that he demonized all 
who fell short of the standards he imposed on himself. ,!lo 
Clearly, Tetlock would characterize this as classic "hedgehog" 
behavior. 
It is always dangerous to generalize. Perhaps other aspects 
of Justice Scalia's personality have more to do with his judicial 
behavior than does his "puzzle" theory of constitutional inter-
pretation. Perhaps, as George Kannar has argued, the rigidity of 
the question-and-answer church catechism experienced by Jus-
tice Scalia as a Roman Catholic coming of age in the 1950's is 
more responsible for Scalia's demeanor than his "law as a puz-
zle" beliefs. 111 
In fact, compare Scalia with two ''total incorporation" jus-
tices who each believed that the meaning of Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process was nothing more than the collected 
provisions of the Bill of Rights-Hugo Black and William Doug-
las. Their views on the "puzzle" quality of Fourteenth Amend-
recent opinion: "Justice Alito seemed to recognize [the validity of the opposing argu· 
ment] as recently as. well. today:· /d. at 2682 n.5 (referring to Justice Alito's concurring 
opinion in Morse v. Frederick. 127 S. Ct. 2618. 2636 (2007)). In another case. Scalia criti-
cized yet another opinion written by Alito and joined by Roberts for its "meaningless 
and disingenuous distinctions .. under the guise of "judicial minimalism." Hein v. Free-
dom From Religion Foundation. Inc .. 127 S. Ct. 2553. 2573 (2007) (Scalia. J .. concurring 
in the judgment). In fact. the exceptionally acerbic tone of Scalia's comments even mer-
ited front-page coverage in The New York Times. Linda Greenhouse. Even in Agree-
ment, Scalia Puts Roberrs to Lash. N.Y. TIMES. June 28. 2007. at 1 col.2. 
108. CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH. JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME 
COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MOMENT 99-101 ( 1993 ). 
109. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Planned Parenthood of Sowheastern Pa. v 
Casey. 505 U.S. 833. 843 (1992) Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined Justice Souter in 
an opinion refusing to overturn Roe. 
110. ROSEN supra note 96. at 182-83. Indeed. Judge Alex Kozinski has even written 
that Justice Scalia's rigidity extends to where to eat pizza. Alex Kozinski. My Pizza With 
Nino. 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1583 (1991) (humorously describing Scalia's insistence that 
A V's restaurant in Washington was the only place he would go for pizza). 
111. George Kannar. Comment. The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia. 99 
YALE L.J. 1297. 1313-15 (1990) (describing Scalia's '"catholic' constitutional vision .. aris-
ing from learning the faith through the Baltimore Catechism. a text that provided a 
"written. though extra-Scriptural tradition serving much like [legal] precedent''). Cf 
Donald L. Beschle. Catechism or Imagination: Is Justice Scalia's Judicial Style Tvpically 
Catholic?. 37 VILL. L. REV. 1329. 1333 (1992) (disputing the concept that Scalia provides 
.. the most likely model of a Catholic judicial style"). 
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ment Due Process were identical- Douglas joined completely in 
Black's dissent in Adamson v California, discussed above. 11 c 
Douglas, like Scalia, had no doubts about his own constitu-
tional theory. And he was also similar to Scalia in that, according 
to Rosen, "He made no effort to persuade colleagues of his own 
position .... "113 He could also be as acerbic with colleagues as 
Scalia. A well-known story tells of Douglas completing a dissent 
in a case before the majority opinion was written. As time wore 
on and no majority opinion was forthcoming, Douglas became so 
impatient he also drafted a majority opinion and sarcastically 
sent it to the justice who was assigned to write it. 11 -l Not surpris-
ingly, Justice Blackmun said that Douglas ··never had a close 
friend [on the Court]."w 
Compare Douglas to Black, who also believed that the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause was 
a clearly solvable puzzle. In contradistinction to Douglas, Black 
cared deeply about building coalitions on the Court. Justice 
Blackmun described Black as a "canny, lovable manipulator.'' 110 
Rosen characterized Black as a "pragmatic" justice, one who was 
"willing to compromise or to add language to an opinion if he 
thought it would win him additional votes." 117 True, Black could 
be personally difficult at times; his legendary feud with Justice 
Robert Jackson in the 1940's exposed the Court to public embar-
rassment.11x Yet, Justice Harlan-Black's polar opposite in his 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause-had this to say about the state of the Supreme Court in 
1963: "Things are very troublesome ... [but] Justice Black has 
been a rock. He is saving the Court. Some men are institutional 
men, who care about the institution, and Black is one of them." 11" 
Black returned the compliment: "John Harlan is one of the few 
112. Of course. there was much that Black and Douglas did not agree on. Compare 
Douglas's very un-puzzle-like discussion of penumbral rights in Griswold 1· Connecricu£, 
3R1 L·.s. 479. 484-85 (1965) with Black's dissent in that case. /d. at 509-10 (Black. J .. dis-
senting) ("I get nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional ·right of privacy· as an 
emanation from one or more constitutional provisions."). 
113. ROSEN. supra note 96. at 152. 
11-l. /d. at 153. 
115. HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER. OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK. 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS. AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 78 ( 1992). 
116. /d. 
117. ROSEN. supra note 96. at 153. 
118. /d. at 147-48. 
119. ROGER K. NEWMAN. HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 543-44 (Pantheon 1994). 
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people who convince me that there is such a thing as a good Re-
publican. " 1'" 
And that political jibe may offer a clue to why Black was 
different from his fellow "puzzle" justices, Douglas and Scalia. 
Black entered the Court from the world of electoral politics: he 
came directly from representing Alabama in the U.S. Senate. In 
Blackmun 's affectionate words, Black was "ever the politician, 
ever the U.S. Senator still." 121 Black knew how to leaven his bed-
rock constitutional principles with the skills of a candidate work-
ing the Talladega County Fair. Interestingly, Black admired the 
affable personality and political savvy of another member of the 
Court- William Brennan, who learned his lessons through years 
of New Jersey labor disputes. Brennan's "people skills" led 
Black to declare ''Bill is my heir. "122 And not surprisingly, 
Black's political acumen was recognized and relied upon by a 
three-term Governor of California-Chief Justice Earl Warren. 
Warren's biographer Jim Newton unequivocally states that 
"Black was Warren's most important mentor'' on the Court.m 
Unlike Black, neither Scalia nor Douglas ever held elective 
office. Perhaps a justice with a "puzzle'' proclivity harnessed to 
political skills can escape ideological isolation on the Court. But 
ideological isolation appears to be the situation shared by An-
tonio Scalia and William Douglas-two justices absolutely con-
vinced they have solved the constitutional puzzle, but each lack-
ing the skills to convince their colleagues of this fact. 
CONCLUSION 
Adherents of either side of the puzzle/mystery dichotomy 
could be said to be cursed. 
Fox-like thinkers such as Breyer and Popper face a world 
that lacks intellectual certainty. The recognition that they are 
dealing with "mysteries" or "problems" means that they are 
aware that the concept of a final answer can be no more than a 
chimera. Breyer speaks of a judge starting with an "attitude'' to 
approach imprecise texts that embody merely "aspirations" or 
"moods." Popper falls back on his frequently cited maxim "I 
may be wrong and you may be right." Like Moses, they face a 
120. !d. at 5SK 
121. BALL & COOPER. supra note 115. at 78. 
122. NE\\~!A'.;. supra note 119. at 50S. 
123. JJ~! NE\\TO'.;.]LSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN AI'D THE NATION HE MADE 
34S (Riverhead 200o). 
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lifetime of wandering in the desert. But unlike Moses. there is no 
guarantee of even seeing the Promised Land from afar. 
But the hedgehogs who see the world in "puzzles'' may be 
doubly cursed. First, many will deny that their solutions are cor-
rect. Second, many will deny that the problems were even "puz-
zles" to begin with. How much of Wittgenstein's frustration with 
Popper may have resulted from a Cassandra-like certainty that 
he was right and that Popper-and Russell and others-
stubbornly refused to listen? Should it really surprise us that at 
Cambridge in 1946 it was the hedgehog who waved the poker 
rather than the fox? 1' 4 Impatience with those who simply "do not 
get if' is a heavy burden. 
As for Scalia, it appears that early in his Supreme Court ca-
reer he must have despaired of ever being a justice like Black or 
Brennan who could use charm as well as brains to put together 
majorities on the Court. A death wish is the only rational expla-
nation for a full-page memo Scalia directed to O'Connor but cir-
culated to the entire court in 1992.m Scalia complained about 
O'Connor's use of the word "implausible" instead of "improb-
able .. in one of her draft opinions. He supported his argument 
with references to Webster's Dictionary and Rogel's Thesaurus. 
He went on to ask her to use the phrase "irrational or incredi-
ble., instead of merely the word "irrational." In solving these 
"puzzles," Scalia uses the kind of "geometric logic" Captain 
Queeg used to determine who stole the strawberries on the 
U.S.S. Caine.1' 6 If his goal was to forever alienate Justice 
O'Connor. he undoubtedly succeeded. 
What Harry Blackmun penned in the margin of his copy of 
the memo could serve as a kind of judicial epitaph for Justice 
Scalia, the paradigmatic hedgehog puzzle-solver bedeviled by 
dull-witted foxes. 
Scalia had concluded his memo with the following: "I 
apologize if these suggestions seem rather picky." 
In response, Blackmun simply wrote two words: "They 
do."t27 
124. Again, I am referring to Wittgenstein as a hedgehog only in the limited sense 
that, at the time of his confrontation with Popper in 1946. he was so adamant about phi-
losophy needing to be approached through "puzzles" that he showed no patience with 
philosophers who used alternative approaches. See supra note 87. 
125. GREENBURG, supra note 70, at 130. 
126. THE CAINE MUTINY (Columbia Pictures 1954). 
127. GREENBURG. supra note 70. at 130. 
